Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese by Burbank, Stephen B
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1985 
Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on 
Marrese 
Stephen B. Burbank 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisdiction 
Commons, Legal Theory Commons, and the Philosophy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Burbank, Stephen B., "Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese" (1985). 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 829. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/829 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: 
Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
AFTERWORDS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
HAZARD 
AND A COMMENT ON MARRESE t 
Stephen B. Burbank tt 
Presenting work-in-progress is risky, not to say hazardous, busi­
ness. Evidently, some of the risks have been realized here, although 
my distinguished commentator has met me on at least part of my 
ground. Indeed, he has tried to appropriate a good deal of it as his 
own. 
A major goal of my work, as the title of my paper suggests, is to 
advance the view that, in most interjurisdictional cases, the only pu­
tative federal preclusion rules available are rules of federal common 
law. Thus, for example, in the federal-state configuration, the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure do not (and cannot validly) provide 
preclusion rules, and in the state-federal configuration, the full faith 
and credit statute does not choose state preclusion law. Professor 
Hazard's comments are confined exclusively to the problem of fed­
eral judgments, which includes the first configuration. 
In suggesting that my argument proves too much, Professor 
Hazard makes a strawman out of an important sub-theme in my 
work, namely that "the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the 
circumstances when it is permissible for federal courts to fashion or 
apply federal common law." 1 In observing that "there is nothing in 
the Rules of Decision Act stating or implying any . . . limitation [to 
cases involving state-law based claims],"2 Professor Hazard is simply 
agreeing with me. Perhaps together we can persuade the Supreme 
Court, whose recent decision confining the Act to diversity cases is 
part of the "rough treatment" I referred to.3 I regret that the con­
straints of a twenty-five minute presentation prevented me from 
elaborating the reasons why, under the Rules of Decision Act (as 
well as under traditional federal common law analysis) , uniform fed­
eral preclusion law governs the preclusive effects of a federal judg-
t © 1985 Stephen B. Burbank 
tt Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, U niversity of Pe nnsylvania. 
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Precluswn and Federal Common Law: Toward a Gene-ral Ap­
proach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 632 ( 1985). 
2 Hazard, Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 642, 643 (1985). 
3 Burbank, supra note 1, at 631 & n.30. See DeiCostello v. International Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2287 n.l3 ( 1983); see also id. at 2295 ( Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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ment adjudicating matters of federal substantive law.4 They will be 
elaborated in the more comprehensive article, of which my paper 
forms a tentative summary. 
In suggesting that my argument proves too little, Professor 
Hazard provides what is lacking in the Restatement (Second) of judg­
ments and most other commentary and cases-a reasoned defense of 
the proposition that, on most matters, uniform federal law should 
govern the preclusive effects of federal judgments adjudicating mat­
ters of state substantive law. In so doing, he expressly rejects a line 
of Supreme Court cases that has only recently been affirmed5 and 
relies on others the vitality of which is in dispute,6 thus confirming a 
suggestion made in my paper.7 I applaud this explicitness; indeed, 
it is just what my paper calls for.8 Of course, now that all the cards 
are on the table, lower federal courts may feel reluctant to apply 
uniform federal preclusion rules in this context. They lack the free­
dom of law professors to overrule the Court. Indeed, even the 
Court can be slow to change its ways, as we are reminded by some­
thing else Holmes said about Swift v. Tyson in the case from which 
Professor Hazard quotes: "I should leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed 
. . . but I would not allow it to spread the assumed dominion into 
new fields."9 
As to the constructive part of the argument for uniform federal 
preclusion rules made by Professor Hazard, it is my position that 
some such rules may plausibly be thought to be required, even for 
judgments on state law claims, by the federal statutes establishing 
the federal courts and vesting them withjurisdiction. The analysis is 
a logical consequence of the theory of respect for federal judgments 
I advance as an alternative to the full faith and credit statute.10 We 
simply disagree as to where fair implication ends and wishful think­
ing begins. 
Professor Hazard asserts that "the question is probably one of 
4 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 631 n.31. 
5 See vvralker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U. S. 740 (1980); see also Ha n na v. Plumer, 
380 U. S. 460, 466-69 (1965) (dictum). 
6 On Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U. S. 525 (1958) as authority for a 
general approach, compare Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 707-
18 (1974), with Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appro­
priate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977). In my view, Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 
283 U. S. 9 1  (193 1), adds nothing to Byrd in support of Professor Hazard's major 
prem1se. 
7 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 636. 
8 ld. at 636. 
9 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
IO See Burbank, supra note 1, at 633; see also id. at 629. Professor Hazard agrees with 
me that the full faith and credit statute does not apply to federal judgments. Hazard, 
supra note 2, at 642. 
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major premise."11 I doubt it, and I certainly do not accept the ma­
jor premise he imputes to me. I did not rely on Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York 12 for a worldview. I did not even rely on it for a reading of the 
Rules of Decision Act. My precise point in citing the case was that 
the results Professor Hazard deplores find their inspiration not in 
that statute but in a "policy of federal jurisdiction" that the Court 
has read into the diversity statute.13 Until disavowed, this policy 
must be confronted when considering federal common law in (but 
only in) diversity cases.14 More generally, whatever one thinks of 
the policy, it is not the only obstacle to uniform federal preclusion 
rules for judgments on state law claims when one adopts-the clos­
est thing to a major premise in my paper-the view that the federal 
preclusion rules are rules of federal common law .15 
Professor Hazard would have us believe that his major premise 
has the support of history. But he attributes to the Rules of Deci­
sion Act a dichotomy between procedure and substantive law that 
other scholars have found lacking.16 Moreover, he ignores the his­
torical evidence that, if we insist upon retrojecting a proce­
dure/substance dichotomy, the Supreme Court has chosen to 
assimilate preclusion rules to substantive law.17 Such may be the 
wages of writing history in the light of major premises rather than 
vice versa.18 Professor Hazard is no more successful in enlisting pre-
1938 history as the ally of his position, argued at a high level of 
generality, than was Professor Degnan, who sought support in par­
ticulars.19  That does not mean that they are wrong. There were, 
after all, some changes made in 1938. But removing history as a 
prop does tend to isolate the normative choices those scholars 
would have us make; perhaps it also shifts the burden of persuasion, 
although precedent may already do that. 
There is an apparent paradox in Professor Hazard's view of 
preclusion. On the one hand, he admits there is a "good case" for 
the proposition that preclusion rules are beyond the Supreme 
I ! 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Hazard, supra note 2, at 645. 
326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
See Burbank, supra note 1, at 636. 
See id. at n.59. 
See id. at 634. 
16 See Hazard, supra note 2, at 645; but see, e.g., Hill, Stale Procedural Law in Federal 
Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66 (1955). 
17 See Hazard, mpra note 2, at 645. But see Burbank, supra note 1, at 630. 
18 See Hazard, supra note 2, at 645 ("Taking as a major premise the proposition that 
the federal courts are an 'independent system for administering justice,' the following 
line of analysis is invited if not compelled . .. .  " ) ; 51Lpra text accompanying notes 16-17. 
Elsewhere Professor Hazard asserts: "[Federal] courts have their own judges, their own 
procedure, their own bar, their own enforcement auxiliaries, their own tradition, their 
own identity. " Hazard, supra note 2, at 647. Procedure? Tradition? Since when? 
19 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 626. 
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Court's rulemaking power under the Enabling Act,20 presumably 
because they would "abridge, enlarge or modify . . . substantive 
right[s]. "21 On the other hand, he describes preclusion rules as a 
"technical specification, "22 akin, I suppose, to the "technical conun­
drums" with which the Court has been "preoccupied. "23 Law re­
formers have long assured us that procedure is technical, details-in 
short, adjective law.24 Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to 
other matters, only in Wonderland do they describe rules of preclu­
sion. Granting for purposes of argument that the Founders would 
have rejected the "Frankfurter thesis,"25 would they have rejected 
the holding in Guaranty Trust?26 If not, why would they have re­
garded statutes of limitations, but not rules of preclusion, as prop­
erly to be furnished by state law?27 These questions seem to me 
more difficult, if we really take the Rules of Decision Act seriously, 
than Professor Hazard's questions about "constitutive rules"2 8 pro­
vided by the Constitution. At least, however, we have begun to 
raise, and suggest answers to, the hard questions. 
* * * 
After my paper was delivered, the Supreme Court decided Mar­
rese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Smgeons .29 In Marrese, it will be 
recalled,30 the Seventh Circuit precluded a federal antitrust claim 
where the plaintiff had previously failed to assert a functionally simi­
lar state antitrust claim in state court litigation.31 A plurality of the 
court, through Judge Posner, reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 did 
not apply and formulated a federal rule of preclusion. 32 The Court 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
Hazard, supra nOle 2, at 642. 
28 u.s.c. § 2072 ( 1982). 
Hazard, supra note 2, at 647. 
!d. 
24 See, e.g., Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 10 15, 1052, 
1068 ( 1982). 
25 Hazard, supra note 2, at 644; see also id. at 645. 
26 Guaranty Trust, 326 U. S. at 1 10 (in suit in equity founded on diversity, state stat­
ute of limitations barring recovery must be followed). 
27 I am assuming that the Founders did not share the limited view of the word 
"laws" in the Rules of Decision Act that was taken in Swift v. Tyson, 4 1  U. S. ( 16 Pet.) 1 
(1842) and rejected in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 ( 1938). Moreover, for these 
purposes I need not invoke the Process Acts, as to which see Burbank, supm note 24, at 
I 036-39. 
28 Hazard, supra note 2, at 647. 
29 53 U. S.L.W. 4265 (U. S. Mar. 4, 1985). 
30 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 640. 
31 Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1 150 (7th Cir. 
!984) (en bane), rev'd, 53 U. S.L.W. 4265 (U. S. Mar. 4, 1985). 
32 726 F.2d at 1 154. Judge Posner reasoned that§ 1738 could not play a role in the 
case because there can be no state preclusion law regarding actions that are exclusively 
within federal jurisdiction. Jd. 
1985] AFTERWORDS 663 
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for considera­
tion whether the federal action is precluded under Illinois law and, 
if so, whether the Sherman Act, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in 
the federal courts, constitutes an implied partial repeal of section 
1738.33 
In contrast to the approach to section 1738 taken below by 
Judge Posner,34 which at least was on the right track, the Court reit­
erated its erroneous general view that section 1738 "directs a fed­
eral court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which 
judgment was rendered. "35 In addition, acknowledging that "a 
state court will not have occasion to address the specific question 
whether a state judgment has issue or claim preclusive effect in a 
later action that can be brought only in federal court, "36 the Court 
responded with reasoning that suggests other weaknesses in its ap­
proach to section 1738. On the one hand, the Court relied on 
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. 37 for a principle of functional 
equivalence, "illustrat[ing] that a federal court can apply state rules 
of issue preclusion to determine if a matter actually litigated in state 
court may be relitigated in a subsequent federal proceeding."3 8 On 
the other hand, the Court blurred any distinction between use of 
state law, mediated through a principle of functional equivalence, 
and use of federal law. For, in addressing the Chief Justice's obser­
vation that state law would likely be indeterminate on the question 
of claim preclusion presented in J'vfarrese, 39 the Court relied on pro­
visions of the Restatement (Second) of judgments stating or contemplat­
ing an interjurisdictional solution that is not, and is not based on, the 
law of any state.4o 
33 53 U.S. L.W. at 4268. 
34 See Burbank, supra note l, at 640-41 n.83; supra note 32. Indeed, the Court mis­
represented judge Posner's opinion for the plurality in the court of appeals. That opin­
ion declined to answer the "unsettled question" of "whether or not section 1738 allows 
a federal court to give a state court's judgment a greater preclusive effect than the state 
courts themselves would give it . . . . " 726 F.2d at 1154. But see 53 U.S.L. W. at 4267-
68 ("Both the plurality opinion, and the concurring opinion, express the view that 
§ 1738 allows a federal court to give a state court judgment greater preclusive effect 
than the state courts themselves would give to it.") (citations omitted). 
35 Afanese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4266. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 640. 
36 lvfamse, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4267. 
37 456 U.S. 461 (1982). 
38 Afamse, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4267. 
39 See id. at 4269 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
40 See id. at 4267 n.3 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF juDGMENTS § 24 com­
ment g and § 26 comment c(l), illustration 2 (1982)). The assumption of an available 
court in the same system, made in the former, is a reflex of the interjurisdictional rule 
stated in the latter. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF juDGMENTS § 26 comment c( I )  
reporter's note. The reporter states: 
When the plaintiff, after having lost a state action, seeks relief with re­
spect to the same transaction under a federal statute enforceable only in 
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The Chief Justice did not go far enough in his concurring opin­
ion in Marrese. He argued that "a fair reading of § 1738 requires 
federal courts to look first to general principles of state preclusion 
law,"41 but that "[i]f state law is simply indeterminate, the concerns 
of comity and federalism underlying § 1738 do not come into 
play. "42 In a case like Marrese, state law is always indeterminate, and 
in any event the statute is simply inapplicable.43 Moreover, these 
may be cases in which state laws do not "apply" within the meaning 
of the Rules of Decision Act.44 Finally, whether under the Act or 
under traditional federal common law analysis,45 in cases of exclu­
sive federal jurisdiction federal courts should be free to fashion uni­
form federal rules of preclusion, adjusting trans-substantive federal 
rules to the extent required by the policies of a particular federal 
statute.46 
In the Supreme Court's recent cases, the choice seemed to be a 
choice between greater (state law) and lesser (federal law) preclusive 
effects. The concurrences in Migra v. Warren City School District Board 
of Education, 47 and now in Marrese, 4 8  point in quite the opposite di­
rection. Those who would thank the Court for small favors should 
remember that state preclusion law respects federal substantive pol­
ICies only fortuitously, 49 and that when it does not, the Court's re­
peal analysis, requiring too much of unsuspecting Congresses, is 
federal court, it may be argued that he should be held barred especial ly if 
he could have instituted his original suit in federal court . . . .  It appears 
sounder, however, not to preclude the federal action by the doctrine of 
bar, but rather to a llow a carry-over decided issue from the state to the 
federal action by way of issue preclusion . . . .  
!d. Elsewhere in i'Vlarrese, the Court observed: 
Even i n  the event that a party asserting the affirmative defense of c laim 
preclusion can show that state preclusion rules in  some circumstances bar 
a c laim outside the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the i nitial judg­
ment, the federal court should first consider whether application of the 
state rules would bar the particular federal c laim. 
53 U. S. L W. at 4267 (footnote omitted). 
41 53 U. S. LW. at 4269 (Burger, C.J., concurring in  judgment). 
42 !d. 
43 Section 1738 is inapplicable because there can be nc subsequent state proceed­
ing in which the same problem of preclusion arises. Burbank, supra note l, at 639. 
44 O n  this view, the Rules of Decision Act would be inapplicable because there is no 
state law on the question. Compare id. at 632. 
45 See id. at 631; supra text accompanying notes 2-3. 
46 Even if uniform federal rules were not thought required by traditional analysis or 
"require[ d)" under the Rules of Decision Act, the most nearly analogous state preclu­
sion rules would be altered to the extent that they were hostile to or inconsistent with 
federa l substantive policies. Cf Burbank, supra note l ,  at 638 (federal common law anal­
ysis where § 1738 does apply). 
4 7 104 S. Ct. 892, 899 ( 1984) (White, J. . concurring); see mfra note 51 and accompa­
nying text. 
48 Afanese, 53 U. S. LW. at 4268 ( Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
49 See Burbank, supra note l, at 640 n.80. 
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unlikely to save the day, perhaps even in exclusive jurisdiction 
cases.50 I think that there is a better way, one that need not lead to 
federal preclusion rules that are disembodied from the substantive 
law. 51 It lies in the analysis of these problems as problems of federal 
common law. 
:>O See 1d. at notes 75-76 and accompanying text. See also Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 
-l::!li7 (noting that Kremer Court declined to decide exclusive jurisdiction question but 
found no exception to § 1738). 
5! For an opinion suggestive of a disembodied federal rule approach, were § 1738 
not thought to prevent it, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 
89?, 899-900 (1984) (White,J. ,  concurring). It is not clear that the criticism applies with 
equal force to the federal rule suggested by the Chiefjustice in !\-Ianese, at least to the 
extent that the inquiry whether "a state statute is identical in all material respects with a 
federal statute within exclusi\'e federal jurisdiction," 53 U.S.L. W. at 4269, contemplates 
a careful analysis of federal statutory policies, including in particular the reasons for the 
grant of exclusi\'e JUrisdiction, and of the implications of those policies for preclusion 
rules. 
